Entradas

Mostrando las entradas de 2014

Aesthetic Realism

The goal of this brief note is to sketch a modest form of aesthetic realism. In particular, I want to defend that at least some aesthetic properties are objective or, to be more precise, that some aesthetic predicates have non-subject-dependent extensions. As example, I will work with the predicate “tasty”  (and its antonym “disgusting”) to argue that its extension is fixed by an objective property: flavour. In other words, when we say of something that it is tasty, we are not saying how it tastes to us, but just how it tastes period.

The structure is as follows. First I will sketch the phenomenon of using subjective, perspectival or context-dependent language for talking of objective, non-perspectival and/or context-invariant properties. I will present first the abstract general account and then illustrate it with the expression “to the left”. This is a perspectival expression, we use to talk about a non-perspectival property of objects: their location. Then, I will argue that we have…

Emociones de Laboratorio y Electrodomésticas

Imagen
Máquinas Emocionales:  Herramientas y Modelos.
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM abarcelo@filosoficas.unam.mx
Resumen: ¿Para qué queremos construir máquinas que muestren y procesen emociones? En este ensayo identifico dos objetivos del proyecto de emociones artificiales dentro de la inteligencia artificial: como herramientas y como modelos. En el primer caso, lo que se busca es  mejorar la interacción humano-máquina, mientras que en el segundo caso lo que se busca es ayudarnos a entender qué papel juegan las emociones en la cognición humana.
Desde mediados de la década de los noventa, el Laboratorio de Inteligencia Artificial del Instituto de Tecnología de Massachussets (MIT) ha dedicado muchos de sus recursos a desarrollar lo que, en los ojos de muchos, pertenece mas al ámbito de la ciencia ficción que de la ciencia: la construcción y desarrollo de robots emocionales. Pero no es solo el MIT; la Sociedad de Computo en el Mundo Real del MITI (Ministe…

Coextensividad Real (sobre David Liebesman)

Coextensividad Real
El principio de Hume parece tener como consecuencia directa que si dos predicados abiertos P y Q son coextensivos, entonces hay tantos Ps como Qs y, por lo tanto, el número de Ps es el mismo que el número de Qs.
Desafortunadamente, esto no es así, como ha defendido David Liebesman recientemente. 
Considera los siguientes dos predicados [ejemplo mío, basado en los ejemplos de Liebesman]:
Px = x es una naranja. Qx = x es una naranja entera.
Dada la definición tradicional de coextensividad, P y Q son coextensivos (a decir verdad, son necesariamente coextensivos también): Toda naranja es una naranja entera y sólo las naranjas enteras son naranjas. Sin embargo, es claro que en mucha circunstancias, el número de naranjas no será el número de naranjas enteras. Por ejemplo, si tenemos tres naranjas y media en una canasta, el número de naranjas será tres y medio, y el número de naranjas enteras será tres.
Coextensividad Tradicional: Dos predicados abiertos P y Q son coextensivos s…

What makes logical necessities true?

For example: A.Jonah Hill is alive or he is not. What makes A true? As far I can tell, there are four kinds of proposals: 1.Contingentism: A is true because Jonah Hill is alive (or because of whatever makes Jonah be alive).2.Essentialism: A is true in virtue of disjunction and negation having the logical nature they have.3.Representationalism: A is true because the actual world is a possible world. Pros and Cons: 4.Contingentism: A is true because Jonah Hill is alive (or because of whatever makes Jonah be alive).a.PROS: i.Does not require postulating special entities like worlds and logical operations.ii.Offers a uniform account of the way operations affect truthmaking for contingent and necessary truths, i.e., it respects the following truth-making principle: truth-bearers of the form PvQ are made true by what makes P true (if P is true) plus what makes Q true (if it is true).b.CONS: i.Makes necessary truths less metaphysically fundamental than contingent facts.ii.Truth-making without …

Good Advice for Philosophers

Literary Authors’ Good Advice for Philosophers (if they were talking about philosophy): • The reader is a friend, not an adversary, not a spectator. Jonathan Franzen
• Do not place a photograph of your favourite philosopher on your desk, especially if the philosopher is one of the famous ones who committed suicide. Roddy Doyle
• Cut (perhaps that should be CUT): only by having no inessential words can every essential word be made to count. Diana Athill
• Only bad philosophers think that their work is really good. Anne Enright
• Prayer might work. Or reading something else. Or a constant visualisation of the holy grail that is the finished, published version of your resplendent article or book. Margaret Atwood
• Do change your mind. Good ideas are often murdered by better ones. Roddy Doyle
• Marry somebody you love and who thinks you being a professional philosopher’s a good idea. Richard Ford
• It's doubtful that anyone with an internet connection at his workplace is writing good …