Relativism and Moral Luck revisited
Contextualist and relativists regarding epistemic modals quarrel on how to account for phenomena like the following: Sally’s mother comes into Sally’s bedroom to find her looking under the bed. “What is going on?” asks Sally’s mother, “why are you looking under the bed?” (1) “My glasses, they might be there,” replies Sally. After taking a long look under he bed, Sally finds no glasses under it. So she moves on to look in other places, but not before saying, (2) “Oops, I was wrong.” What is going on here? According to me, this is just a case of moral luck, but in the context of assertion. According to Andrew Latus (2001): The problem of moral luck traps us between an intuition and a fact: . 1) the intuition that luck must not make moral differences (e.g., that luck must not affect a person’s moral worth, that luck must not affect what a person is morally responsible for). . 2) the fact [Berg-Cross 1975, Cushman et.al. 2009, Cushman 2008, etc.] that luck does se